Top Three Videos – September 15, 2026
Bill Ackman: The Contrarian Playbook That Built a 36 Billion Dollar Empire...(September 8, 2026)
CAZ Investments and Tony Robbins...
Summary
Ackman walks through the structural advantage behind Pershing Square’s 19% annual compounding over 22 years versus the S&P’s 10% — permanent capital that lets liabilities match assets, a concentrated 12 to 15 name portfolio, and the ability to buy from sellers who believe a mismanaged situation will never change and then change it themselves, as with Chipotle after its food safety crisis. He details the July IPO of Pershing Square USA, a $5 billion raise he calls the largest closed-end fund IPO in history and a top-20 IPO overall, in which retail buyers received a free slice of the management company (PS, now roughly $14 billion market cap), and explains that PSUS trades at about a 21% discount because retail got full allocations they never expected and dumped the stock to cover settlement. He also lays out the black-swan hedging that has driven a large share of returns — subprime CDS in 2007, a COVID CDS hedge that turned $27 million into $2.6 billion in 2020, and interest rate swaptions worth nearly $3 billion — with the proceeds recycled into equities each time.
Top 5 Key Topics
- Howard Hughes as a Berkshire-style compounder: Pershing closed the purchase of Vantage Holdings, a P&C specialty insurer and reinsurer, and just recruited Marc Grandisson — Arch Capital’s CEO for eight years with a 23% IRR — as executive chair, with David Gansberg as CEO. Pershing will manage Vantage’s assets for free, mirroring what Buffett brought to Berkshire, and Ackman notes the stock trades near $72 against roughly $110 to $120 per share of underlying real estate.
- The General Growth trade that created Howard Hughes: Pershing paid $60 million for 25% of a company whose market cap had fallen 99.5%, from $20 billion to $100 million, against $27 billion of debt. That $60 million became nearly $3 billion, and the non-mall assets were spun into Howard Hughes largely to make the mall company more attractive.
- “Hell is coming” and the CNBC edit: The segment ran 28 minutes and described his advice to Hilton’s CEO to draw credit lines and defer capex, but CNBC replayed a 12-second clip for weeks while he was actually buying — Hilton at $55, Lowe’s at $70. The market was down 6% when he went on and 10% by the time he got off; he notes Buffett only appears live on CNBC so he cannot be spliced.
- 48 people managing $36 billion: There is no individual P&L — everyone is compensated on the single portfolio, which removes the usual analyst incentive to get capital allocated to their own idea and makes it routine for the person who led an investment to recommend selling it. Two receptionists have been there eight years against an industry average of about 90 days, and when Pershing went public they and the woman who cleans the space received millions in equity.
- Downside first, and one piece of advice: Ackman looks for dominant, asset-light, royalty-like businesses with low leverage where two Stanford dropouts cannot disrupt them in a garage, noting AI is filling in moats and making disruption risk the hardest thing to assess. His closing advice is to avoid FOMO into wherever money is being made and instead buy a business you cannot envision being smaller and less profitable in 10, 20 or 30 years, then never sell it.
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Catherine Austin Fitts: They Will Turn Your Money Off! Incoming Stablecoins More Dangerous Than CBDCs...(September 14, 2026)
ITM Trading Ltd...
Summary
Fitts recounts leaving the Bush administration because she was being ordered to break the law, then having her firm Hamilton Securities — lead financial adviser to the FHA — targeted by the Justice Department when its databases began exposing mortgage fraud, with her software held under court control and a sustained effort to destroy her name (“before they can kill you they have to kill your name”). Her central claim is that the federal government has never once obeyed its financial disclosure laws since 1996, producing $21 trillion in undocumentable adjustments that she and Michigan State’s Dr. Mark Skidmore documented at DoD and HUD, and that FASAB Statement 56 — passed while the country watched the Kavanaugh hearings — now lets a secret group remove a secret amount from federal financial statements, extending to contractors and big banks. She argues the real story now is the assembly of the largest bubble-blowing machine she has ever seen, launching early next year through stablecoins and tokenized securities on crypto rails.
Top 5 Key Topics
- The mechanics of the missing money: Rumsfeld’s announcement of $2.3 trillion missing from the Pentagon the day before 9/11 was part of $4.4 trillion that vanished between fiscal 1998 and 2001, followed by a $6.5 trillion Pentagon figure in 2015. Her test is scale: if the Department of the Army has six times more undocumentable adjustments than budget, it is not an accounting entry, any more than a church with a $500,000 budget missing $6 million.
- Why stablecoins are more dangerous than a CBDC: A CBDC needs authorizing legislation and the Fed is a creature of Congress with public policy obligations and FOIA exposure. Privately issued stablecoins mandated to apply whatever controls Treasury dictates deliver the same government control with none of those constraints, plus room for the issuers to grift and skim.
- The four-billion-customer bubble plan: Treasury aims to market stablecoins to retail worldwide for $3 to $4 trillion into the Treasury market by decade’s end, while Coinbase and others plan tokenized US large-cap stocks with 20 times margin. She compares it to West Germany tendering for East Germans through the currency in 1989, and to the pallets of cash sent to Iraq, and cites Marc Andreessen’s expectation that the US goes from 68% to 90% of the global stock market.
- What she would ask Scott Bessent: If you plan to market $4 trillion of stablecoins to the world, why brag about seizing a billion dollars of Iranian wallets — what was that about? Her second question is why he illegally gave Musk all the data from the IRS and the payment systems.
- The people bank: After the litigation cut off her credit and income, she discovered she had loaned or gifted about $250,000 to family and friends over the years and that exactly $250,000 came back over the following 11 years, without which she says she would not have made it. She contrasts American atomization with Italian families who finance each other internally and therefore cannot be broken the same way, and points to Solari’s free “Coming Clean” guide plus preserving cash and analog systems as the concrete first moves.
Bob Klein: He Called the Dot-Com and Housing Bubbles. Here’s What He’s Betting On Now...(September 6, 2026)
Miles Franklin Media...
Summary
Klein, who warned on the dot-com bubble in Barron’s in November 1999 and shorted housing ahead of 2008, says we are unambiguously in another bubble — the Wilshire 5000 to GDP ratio sits near 237%, the 99.9th percentile — but that bubbles do not pop unless central banks tighten forcefully, so he sees six months to a year of further upside rather than weeks. He does not believe the hyperscalers can earn an adequate return on capex running into the trillions, paraphrasing Zuckerberg’s logic that they have no choice because competitors will spend anyway, but expects a 1970s-style grinding decline and stagflation rather than a crash, with Kevin Warsh tightening gradually after the election and stepping back to assess. His highest-conviction idea is gold miners, which he presents blind as “industry A” growing faster than the Magnificent Seven on both sales and earnings while trading at a far lower multiple, with a margin of safety because they stay very profitable even if gold goes nowhere.
Top 5 Key Topics
- Liquidity plus a narrative equals distortion: The most liquid US money supply measures have more than doubled since the start of COVID, and mixing that with the AI story produces the same dynamic as prior bubbles. He likens it to injecting a patient with adrenaline or steroids — the patient feels great for a while, but you create excesses, and pointing out valuations does not work because people making money “are not going to listen; you have to hit them over the head.”
- The miners’ margin of safety: All-in costs are still around $2,000 an ounce or less against gold near $4,400 to $4,500, margins are eye-popping, and companies are buying back shares and paying disciplined dividends rather than doing crazy M&A, with Newmont and Barrick slimming down. He prefers producers over explorers, acknowledges jurisdictional risk in Africa and elsewhere, and targets $10,000 gold by 2030 or the early 2030s while insisting he does not need it to get there.
- Central banks rebuilding gold reserves: Gold was over 70% of total official reserves before the 1971 experiment, fell to roughly 10%, and is back to about 27% — a process he puts in the fourth inning. He calls 1971 the start of “a high school chemistry experiment,” noting the US dollar has lost roughly 88% of its value since, the Australian dollar 93%, the pound 92% and the Canadian dollar 87%.
- Rome and Kublai Khan as the same story twice: The Roman denarius went from nearly 100% silver to virtually zero by around 230 AD to fund what he calls the origin of the welfare state, with gold aurei simply shrunk in size. Marco Polo marveled at Kublai Khan’s mulberry-bark paper money, which went to zero after overissuance and a ban on citizens owning gold and silver — one of five Chinese paper-money experiments through the Ming that all ended the same way.
- Gold is money, not a doomsday hedge: Klein rejects the framing that gold only works if everything else collapses, pointing out gold went from $35 to $4,500 since 1971 while the world did not end. The question is simply where to hold the money portion of a portfolio — euros, dollars, yen, or gold — and he calls it a matter of math, adding that the average 10-year Treasury yield since 1971 is close to 6% against 4.75% today, with interest costs headed toward roughly $1.3 trillion over the next 12 months.